








Demanding is a fundamental rhetorical strategy for marginalized groups, but recent rhetorical 
theories of demanding have not explained how speakers can design demands to influence 
addressees to accede. Psychoanalytic and decolonial theories have identified constitutive 
functions, but have not explained how speakers can design demands that pressure addressees to 
accede. Speech act theories have explained specific kinds of demands but have not synthesized 
insights into a model of demanding generally. We draw on normative pragmatic theory to argue 
that speakers design demands that generate persuasive force by openly making visible their 
intent to influence addressees to accede and bringing to bear a reciprocal obligation for 
themselves and addressees to live up to the norm of “right makes might.”  
 





The Persuasive Force of Demanding 
Introduction 
A paradigm case of demanding involves making utterances designed to influence 
addressees to accede.1 It would be incoherent to say, “I demand you to x, but I am not saying that 
you ought to x,” or “I demand you to x, although I am fully aware that you cannot x.” The 
extraordinary nature of demanding may be gleaned from anomalous utterances such as: 
“Employees may demand time off by notifying scheduling managers at least one month in 
advance,” and “Faculty members may demand an extension of the tenure clock in writing to the 
provost.” Demanding is less anomalous in protest rhetoric and in fact an important strategy for 
marginalized groups who “are criticized for not handling conflicts and controversies through 
normal, proper channels and procedures, even when those channels and procedures are 
systematically denied them” (Stewart, Smith, and Denton 2007, 8; see also Bowers et al. 2010). 
Whence the persuasive force of demanding? 
Three recent rhetorical theories of demanding have not addressed this fundamental 
question. First, psychoanalytic accounts of demanding (e.g., Lundberg 2012a, 2012b) have 
explained constitutive functions of demands, describing demanding as a trope that shores up 
subject identity and gives retroactive coherence to subjects. Second, decolonial accounts of 
demanding (e.g., Enck-Wanzer 2006; Wanzer-Serrano 2015) have also focused primarily on 
constitutive functions. Third, rhetorical accounts based in speech act theory (e.g., Burgess 2013, 
2015) have described features of specific kinds of demands—demands for apology and for 
recognition—but have not outlined a coherent account of demanding generally.  
We submit a rhetorical theory of demanding that describes its normative structure, and 
we show that the theory accounts for design strategies used in a case of successful demanding. 
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Drawing on normative pragmatic theory (e.g., Goodwin 2001, 2007, 2011; Innocenti 2011; 
Innocenti and Miller 2016; Jacobs 2000, 2016; Kauffeld 1998, 2001, 2009; van Eemeren et al. 
2014), we argue that the normative structure of demanding involves speakers (1) openly making 
visible (a) their intent to influence addressees to accede, thereby (b) incurring an obligation to 
live up to a norm captured by the aphorism “right makes might.” (2) The obligation is reciprocal; 
both speakers and addressees can hold each other accountable for recognizing and living up to 
the norm. (3) As a result, demanding creates two reasons for addressees to accede. (a) First, 
addressees can reason that speakers would not risk criticism for failing to live up to the norm 
unless they can show they are in the right and counting on rightness, in contrast to threats or 
coercive tactics, to be the source of influence. (b) Second, speakers can reason that addressees 
will be influenced to accede in order to avoid criticism for failing to live up to the norm—for 
remaining conspicuously in the wrong or for deploying coercive power to squelch demands. 
Our argument proceeds in three parts. First, we review three recent rhetorical theories of 
demanding to illustrate the needs that our model of the normative structure of demanding meets. 
Second, we defend the model analytically. Third, we illustrate that it accounts for the design 
strategies used in a case of actual, successful demanding. 
  
Psychoanalytic theory of demanding 
Since Gregg (1971) published his landmark essay on the ego-function of protest rhetoric, 
psychoanalytic theories of demanding have explained how demanding shores up demanders’ 
subject identities but not how demanding generates persuasive force for addressees to accede. 
Practical and intellectual starting points of psychoanalytic theories have lead to accounts 
featuring subject identity formation. A practical starting point has been cases of demands that on 
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face appear to be non-serious in the sense that they are not designed to pressure addressees to 
accede. Gregg aimed to account for cases involving protestors “moving to a perspective which 
includes the total social, political, and economic scene,” where “demands go beyond the power 
of the authorities to act; it somehow seems unreasonable to expect the president of a 
Pennsylvania university to be able to grant amnesty to Bobby Seale” (1971, 73). In addition, 
Gregg asserted that the “usual” view of rhetorical transactions—which “expects the entreaties, 
appeals, arguments, and exhortations of those asking for change to speak somehow to the basic 
reasoning and feeling capacities of those in authority”—does not fit “contemporary public 
protest”: “The escalation of demands, in fact the very couching of wishes in terms of demands, 
appears to those in positions of power, reacting to the rhetoric, to foreclose meaningful 
discussion” (1971, 73). So Gregg concluded “that the primary appeal of the rhetoric of protest is 
to the protestors themselves, who feel the need for psychological refurbishing and affirmation,” 
and that “the ego-function of rhetoric has to do with constituting self-hood through expression” 
(1971, 74). 
Since that time, rhetorical scholars have developed increasingly sophisticated 
psychoanalytic theories of demanding. The theories continue to begin with cases of demands that 
on face do not appear to be serious in the sense that they are designed to pressure addressees to 
accede. As a consequence, the theories feature subject identity formation and maintenance. They 
diagnose and address a potential political problem generated just by demanding. On one hand, 
subjects may demand change in hegemonic structures but, on the other hand, may depend on 
those very structures in order to claim a marginal subject identity. If addressees accede to 
subjects’ demands, then a measure of subjects’ identity as marginalized outsiders collapses. To 
shore up their marginal identity, demanding subjects become alienated from their desire and 
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satisfied just by demanding rather than by actually influencing addressees to accede (Lundberg 
2012a, 2012b). 
A second starting point of psychoanalytic theories, assumptions about the nature of 
language, explains why psychoanalytic accounts of demanding feature shoring up subject 
identity. Following Laclau, psychoanalytic theory has defined the fundamental problem of 
language as one of “signification” (Lundberg 2012b, 299)—a failure of language to signify 
“without remainder” (Lundberg 2012a, 3). Rhetoric has been theorized as “the effectivity of 
trope in the context of failed unicity” (Lundberg 2012a, 47), so use of a trope is “a mode of 
enjoyment” that subjects “invest in” because it “lends durability to social formations” (Lundberg 
2012a, 126). In other words, the “subject identifies with an external image of itself for the sake 
of providing its practices of subjectivity with a kind of enjoyable retroactive coherence” 
(Lundberg 2012b, 304). This account features constitutive but not instrumental functions. 
In short, psychoanalytic theories have explained how what appears to be non-serious 
demanding can generate grounds for political action by dint of the subject identities to which 
demanding gives coherence and durability in the face of the failure of language to signify 
without remainder. But they have not explained how demands that on face appear to be serious 
attempts to pressure addressees to accede can reasonably be expected to generate persuasive 
force. 
 
Decolonial theory of demanding 
Like psychoanalytic theory, decolonial theory (e.g., Enck-Wanzer 2006; Wanzer-Serrano 
2015) has foregrounded constitutive functions of demanding. For example, Wanzer-Serrano 
(2015; Enck-Wanzer 2006) has explained constitutive functions of demands made by the Young 
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Lords Organization in the summer of 1969 in the context of the “garbage offensive.” Every 
Sunday members of the Young Lords Organization cleaned up garbage in El Barrio, a 
predominantly Puerto Rican section of New York City. The Young Lords Organization 
demanded that the New York City Sanitation Department do its job and collect the garbage. 
When the Sanitation Department refused, members of the Young Lords Organization and the El 
Barrio community blocked busy intersections with garbage heaps and, over time, intensified their 
actions by setting fire to the garbage, overturning cars, and more. Their demand strategy 
achieved some measure of instrumental success in pressuring the Sanitation Department to pick 
up the garbage occasionally but not regularly. In his analysis of the garbage offensive, Wanzer-
Serrano has foregrounded the constitutive function of demanding: it was among the acts that 
“successfully constituted the people and space of El Barrio as potential agents of change” (2015, 
124). Likewise, in other work Wanzer-Serrano has theorized constitutive benefits of unsatisfied 
demands, asserting that a “demand is interesting and important precisely because it is not 
satisfied—which means that it continues to drive the relation between self and other, thus 
keeping the processes of identification open or deferred and forming the contingent foundation 
of a radical democratic politics” (Enck-Wanzer 2011, 63). 
Decolonial theory is designed to explain practices that “attempt to delink from 
modernity/coloniality” (Wanzer-Serrano 2015, 11). Decolonial theorizing does not involve 
whole cloth rejection of theorizing that reproduces coloniality and proceeds from geographical 
locations and bodies of “epistemic privilege” (Wanzer-Serrano 2015, 24-25, 86). But decolonial 
theorizing can “re-accent” (Wanzer-Serrano 2015, 27) Western theorizing so the theorizing 
speaks from and to the Global South. Significantly, decolonial theorizing involves reading 
marginalized discourses on their own terms. In what follows, we note in a Western accent three 
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significant affinities with normative pragmatic theorizing which, like decolonial theorizing, 
involves attending to what social actors say and what they say they are doing (e.g., Goodwin 
2001; Innocenti and Miller 2016). 
First, Wanzer-Serrano (2015) has accounted for the functioning of the garbage offensive 
by explaining how strategies redesign the scene to produce constitutive outcomes which, in turn, 
influence action. The insight that social actors communicatively create contexts has enabled 
scholars to explain how social actors can communicatively design contexts that enable and 
constrain actions and interactions, creating more favorable conditions or grounds for disputation, 
deliberation, reflection, and the like (e.g., Aakhus and Laureij 2012; Jackson 1998; Jacobs 2006; 
Tracy 2012). Wanzer-Serrano has explained how participants in the garbage offensive deployed 
various rhetorical forms and “fundamentally altered the scene in a manner that allowed for 
different agents and agencies to emerge” (2015, 141). 
Second, Wanzer-Serrano (2015) has accounted for the functioning of the garbage 
offensive in terms of the visibility and accountability that it generated. Comparable to what Asen 
has described as the “responsibility attribution” function of arguing in “situations in which less 
powerful actors compel more powerful actors to accept public responsibility for decisions that 
they have made in restricted deliberative situations” (2005, 119), Wanzer-Serrano (2015) has 
explained how the Young Lords knew full well that New York City sanitation department 
officials would not accede to their demands that it do its job and collect garbage in El Barrio—
demands that on face appeared to be serious because the sanitation department was able and 
ought to collect garbage in El Barrio—but they made demands anyway in order to display that 
“the system” was broken. The ongoing presence of garbage in light of the ignored demands made 
conspicuous “both evidence of the state’s disrespectful and malicious attitude toward the 
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community and proof of ‘the system’s’ incapability to deal with its own intemperance” (Wanzer-
Serrano 2015, 129). The demand strategy in the garbage offensive redesigned a space that 
enabled the people of El Barrio to hold the sanitation department and broader system accountable 
for complicity with significant problems and to recognize their own political agency in bringing 
the problems to light and addressing them. 
Third, Wanzer-Serrano (2015) has accounted for a case of successful demanding in terms 
of pressure to adhere to democratic norms of interaction explicitly brought to bear in a situation. 
Within the Young Lords Organization, members of the cadre successfully demanded gender 
equality from members of the Central Committee by using the organization’s own democratic 
procedures. They held a large meeting in which members of the Central Committee were 
charged, people testified, and a vote was taken to discipline the Central Committee members. 
Wanzer-Serrano has explained the persuasive force of their actions: “the structural reformulation 
of the Young Lords was a direct result of the cadre asserting their rights to democratic 
participation and holding all members accountable to the same rules” (2015, 102). As Tracy has 
suggested, not only the strategy of invoking rules but even the strategy of naming a norm such as 
“reasonable hostility” (2012, 205) makes norms available to social actors to structure interaction. 
Strategies make visible rules or norms, so enable interactants to hold each other accountable for 
acting in accord with them. 
In sum, although Wanzer-Serrano’s theorizing (2015) has featured constitutive functions 
of demanding, along the way he has accounted for both constitutive and instrumental 
achievements in ways that align with normative pragmatic accounts. Significantly, both Wanzer-
Serrano (2015) and members of the Young Lords Organization have accounted for the 
persuasive force of strategies by pointing to the visibility and accountability that strategies 
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generate as they change the scene or context. As we will see, that kind of account describes the 
normative structure of demanding generally. 
 
Speech act theory of demanding 
Speech act theories address the question of how speakers can design demands to pressure 
addressees to accede. The question is practical, inquiring into how demanding can be designed to 
do what it is ostensibly designed to do rather than inquiring into other functions demanding may 
serve. In addition, the question features not referential functions of language but language as 
action. 
Drawing on the fundamental insight of speech act theory that saying something is 
performative—that in saying something we do something (Austin 1962)—Burgess (2013, 2015) 
has developed accounts of demands for apology and demands for recognition. She has described 
both kinds of demands as “speech acts” (2013, 352; 2015, 521): utterances whose power is in 
“the saying” (2015, 530). Rather than attempting to generate a model of demanding generally, 
her account of the demand for recognition, for example, is part of a broader project to analyze 
the rhetoricity of law—an “elision [. . .] repeated in the scholarly critiques that focus on 
recognition’s pathological attachment to identity and/or its inability to challenge structures of 
power” (2015, 519). However, because she begins with a view of language as action, her 
accounts of demands for apology and for recognition point to the normative structure of 
demanding generally. In this section we note four key insights of her accounts, and in the 
following section we synthesize the insights into a coherent model of the normative structure of 
demanding generally. In doing so we necessarily elide details from her accounts of specific kinds 
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of demands, but having a coherent general model of demanding may bring into sharper focus 
“rhetorical contours” (Burgess 2015, 522, 528) of specific kinds of demands. 
First, the fundamental insight of Burgess’ analyses, one she shares with Wanzer-Serrano 
(2015), is that uttering a demand changes the context or, as she has put it, is “an act of rhetorical 
invention that ‘makes a scene’” (Burgess 2015, 522), and “constitutes the scene of address in 
which it operates” (Burgess 2013, 357). For example, Burgess has explained how a demand for 
recognition “creates the structures in which we might engage the terms of law, expose the 
conditions in which law’s claim of recognition is made, and unsettle law’s place as a frame” 
(2015, 532). 
Second, Burgess’ analyses have suggested the need to design a demand that is recognized 
as a demand. This means, first, a speaker must actually utter the demand. As Burgess has put it, 
“both the contingency and the power of a demand for recognition is that it depends on the 
recognizability of the speech act itself” (2015, 530). In addition, a speaker must openly demand 
so, on one hand, she cannot plausibly deny that she is demanding and, on the other hand, 
addressees cannot plausibly deny recognizing that she is demanding. The demand must be 
“transparent” (Burgess 2015, 527) and “heard as a demand” (Burgess 2015, 528). Burgess has 
pointed to the need to act openly when she notes how a speaker who demands an apology may 
respond to the apology: “The success of an apology depends [. . .] on how this apology is ‘taken 
up’ and read. Thus the one who demands an apology judges whether the apology meets the 
conditions of recognizability in the particular context” (2013, 353). By openly apologizing, the 
apologizer constrains the demander of apology from easily, perfunctorily dismissing her 
utterance as not an apology. 
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Third, Burgess’ analyses have pointed to the claim to occupy the moral high ground 
implied just by demanding. For example, by demanding an apology, a speaker “claims the high 
ground, a position from which he takes authority to pass judgment on [the addressee’s] speech 
and actions” (Burgess 2013, 355). Moreover, Burgess has observed that the point of demanding 
an apology may be to serve as “a performance of the place (and the power) the speaker claims by 
virtue of the demand” (2013, 355). 
Fourth, Burgess’ analyses have foregrounded the insight that demanding entails risk. For 
example, “To demand recognition is to take a risk and to occupy a place from which one might 
(later) be displaced. It is possible that the other might not hear the demand or understand what 
the demand means. It is possible that one’s demand will be met with doubt. It is possible that 
one’s demand will be read as a joke or a rhetorical question” (2015, 531), it “might entail 
humiliation, injury, violence, and perhaps even death” (2015, 527). 
In sum, Burgess’ (2013, 2015) accounts of specific kinds of demands have pointed to 
features of demanding generally: demanding (1) communicatively changes the context, (2) must 
be performed openly and recognizably, (3) implies a claim to occupy the high ground, and (4) 
entails risks. Joined to Wanzer-Serrano’s (2015) observation that (5) strategies generate 
accountability to live up to norms, these insights help to account for why a demander who simply 
says, “I demand you to x” can reasonably expect just that utterance to influence addressees to 
accede. In what follows we synthesize these insights into a model of the normative structure of 
demanding generally. 
Normative pragmatic theory of demanding 
 Basic normative pragmatic model 
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Normative pragmatic theories (e.g., Goodwin 2001, 2007, 2011; Innocenti 2011; 
Innocenti and Miller 2016; Jacobs 2000, 2016; Kauffeld 1998, 2001, 2009; van Eemeren et al. 
2014) have explained why speech acts may reasonably be expected to influence addressees just 
as the speaker intends. The theories are “normative” because they locate persuasive force in 
norms that message designs bring to bear in a situation, and “pragmatic” because they account 
for the persuasive force of actual message designs. In broad outline, the basic normative 
pragmatic model is: (1) a speaker’s utterance makes visible her (a) intent and (b) concomitant 
obligation to live up to some norms. (2) The visibility of the intent and obligation enable the 
speaker and addressees to hold each other accountable for living up to the norms. (3) So the 
utterance changes the context to create two reasons for addressees to be influenced. (a) First, 
addressees can reason that the speaker would not risk criticism for failing to discharge 
obligations she has incurred just by saying something unless she can meet them. (b) Second, the 
speaker can reason that addressees will be influenced in order to avoid criticism for failing to 
meet the obligations. 
 Normative pragmatic theories are based on Kauffeld’s (2001, 2009) work in the 
philosophy of language, and specifically a Gricean analysis of utterance-meaning. Kauffeld 
(2001, 2009) has used Grice’s work to outline the intentions and sub-intentions that account for 
what it means to seriously say and mean something, and Stampe’s work to explain how 
addressees’ recognition of a speaker’s intentions gives some reason for them to be influenced. 
Following Kauffeld (2001, 2009), the basic Gricean account of utterance-meaning is that a 
speaker not only intends her utterance to induce some response in addressees (the primary 
speaker intention). She also intends that addressees’ recognition of both (a) the speaker’s primary 
intention and (b) the speaker’s intention for the utterance to induce them to respond gives 
 13 
addressees reasons to respond just as she intends. Why? The speaker’s efforts to secure 
addressees’ recognition of (a) involve deliberately trying to make her primary intention apparent. 
The speaker’s efforts to secure addressee’s recognition of (b) involve openly trying to make (a) 
apparent. These deliberate, open efforts to induce a response give addressees some reason to 
respond as the speaker intends, because the speaker incurs obligations for which addressees can 
hold her accountable.  
 How are obligations communicatively generated, and why are they potentially effective 
in securing the speaker’s intended response? To address these questions, Kauffeld (2001, 2009) 
has used the work of Dennis Stampe to explain how obligations undertaken and discharged by 
speakers give some reason for addressees to respond as the speaker intends. This explanation is 
the linchpin of normative pragmatic accounts of why speakers can reasonably expect their 
performances of illocutionary speech acts, such as proposing and accusing, to pressure 
addressees to act as the speaker intends. To illustrate, consider the basic presumption of veracity. 
When a speaker seriously says and means an utterance, u, she incurs an obligation to speak 
truthfully. The obligation is fundamental because addressees who can easily dismiss a speaker’s 
utterance as untruthful, ignorant, and the like will not experience pressure to be influenced by the 
utterance. So ordinarily, making an utterance licenses addressees to presume the speaker is 
speaking truthfully or, put differently, generates a presumption of veracity: addressees can reason 
that the speaker would not risk criticism for lying, ignorance, and the like unless she had made a 
responsible effort to ascertain the veracity of her utterance. That presumption is one reason, 
created just by saying, “U,” that addressees now have to be influenced by the utterance. 
Obligations incurred by the speaker just by making an utterance are reciprocal, because their 
visibility creates a context in which both speaker and addressees can be held accountable for 
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living up to them; as speakers ought to speak with veracity, so addressees ought not act with 
undue skepticism, cantankerousness, and the like. So bringing to bear an obligation to speak 
truthfully creates a second reason for addressees to be influenced by the utterance: in order to 
avoid criticism for undue skepticism, cantankerousness, and the like, addressees can 
acknowledge the veracity of the utterance. 
Of course rhetorical influence is not as simple as this account, or any account for that 
matter, suggests. As Kauffeld has put it, “the presumption of veracity, upon which statements 
fundamentally depend for their efficacy, does not carry enough practical weight to fulfil[l] the 
speaker’s purpose in the face of doubt, disagreement, evasion, and opposition” (1998, 259; see 
also Pinto 2007). Consequently, speakers routinely make special efforts to influence addressees 
to, say, carefully consider a proposal or accede to a demand—efforts in addition to the basic act 
of saying, “I propose x” or “I demand you to x.” In what follows we outline and analytically 
defend a model of the normative structure of demanding based on just the utterance “I demand 
you to x.” In the next section we show how the model accounts for actual message design, or the 
special communicative efforts that speakers made in a case of successful demanding. 
Normative pragmatic model of demanding 
The sine qua non of demanding is openly making visible an intent to influence addressees 
to accede. Demanding must be recognizable as a demand; it must be serious. It would be 
incoherent for a speaker to say, “I demand you to x, but I do not mean to suggest that you x.” If a 
speaker can plausibly deny the intent to influence addressees to accede to a demand, then 
demanding loses persuasive force because addressees can ignore the utterance with impunity, 
perhaps dismissing it by saying, “You can’t be serious.” 
Besides an obligation to speak truthfully incurred when speakers make serious utterances, 
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what obligations do speakers incur just by demanding? What norms does demanding bring to 
bear in a situation and oblige speakers and addressees to live up to? As we have noted, 
demanding is extraordinary; it is a step outside the bounds of propriety and sounds out of place 
in statements of routine, institutional policies and procedures. This quality indicates another part 
of the normative structure of demanding: demanding implies that ordinary procedures are not 
working, so obligates the speaker to be able to show that addressees are procedurally in the 
wrong. In ordinary circumstances, if an employee said to a scheduling manager that she demands 
time off, the scheduling manager would just need to direct the speaker to follow protocol and 
make a request that the scheduling manager may grant. But if the scheduling manager denied the 
employee’s routine request for time off, the decision appeared to be arbitrary, and the manager 
could not produce good reasons for denying the request, then it may be appropriate for the 
employee to demand time off. This scenario points to another part of the normative structure of 
demanding: demanding implies that addressees are substantively in the wrong so obligates the 
speaker to be able to show just that. It would be incoherent to say, “I demand you to x, but I 
cannot show you why x is the right thing to do.” 
Unlike routine requesting, demanding may routinely produce resentment just because 
demanding implies criticism of addressees and is designed to constrain addressees’ response. 
Inherent to routine requesting is the possibility of addressees accepting or denying the request. A 
faculty member who requests something from a dean maintains the dean’s wiggle room because, 
other things being equal, the dean can accept or deny the request with impunity; requesting 
acknowledges the dean’s prerogative to accept or deny. If the dean is amenable to persuasion in 
routine ways, such as requesting, then there is no need to demand. In contrast, a faculty member 
who demands something from a dean implies a negative judgment about the direction of the 
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dean’s moral compass, and implies that it cannot be corrected unless the dean accedes to the 
demands. The dean may resent that demanding both makes him look bad and reduces his wiggle 
room by pressuring him to accede or look even worse. 
In short, demanding implies that the speaker can show that she occupies the substantive 
and procedural high ground. Her efforts to produce change by using ordinary procedures and 
routine speech acts such as requesting have failed, so she needs to perform a different speech act 
to influence addressees to act. She counts on addressees seeing her occupy the high ground, and 
it is her visibly being in the right that is expected to influence—to generate the persuasive force 
that routine speech acts such as requesting have not. Consequently, we submit that the central 
obligation incurred just by demanding is living up to a political, rhetorical norm that power 
accrued by conspicuously occupying the high ground ought to trump institutional, coercive 
power. This norm is captured in the aphorism “right makes might,” perhaps best known to 
students of rhetoric in its explicit statement by Abraham Lincoln as he exhorted Republicans at 
Cooper Union in 1860: “let us have faith that right makes might, and in that faith, let us, to the 
end, dare to do our duty as we understand it” (Holzer 2004, 284). “Right makes might” is at the 
center of historical and contemporary rhetorical theorizing that describes rhetoric as a way of 
mitigating violence—as a counter to the position that “might makes right,” or “the idea that it is 
acceptable for a dominant party or group to maintain power over the dominated by using 
coercive force” (hooks 2015, 118; Conley 1990; Crosswhite 2013). Demanders demand rather 
than exercise brute force. Because demanding brings that norm to bear in the situation, both 
demanders and addressees can be held accountable for living up to it. 
How does that normative structure—(1) openly demanding to make visible (a) the intent 
to influence addressees to accede and (b) incurring an obligation to live up to the norm of right 
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makes might—account for why somebody uttering a statement of demand may reasonably 
expect just that utterance to pressure addressees to accede? The answer involves Burgess’ (2015) 
and Wanzer-Serrano’s (2015) insights that demanding communicatively changes the context, 
generates accountability, and entails risks. Bringing to bear the norm of right makes might 
redesigns the disagreement space (Jackson 1992, 1998; Jacobs 2006) such that addressees now 
have two reasons to be influenced. To see what these reasons are, recall the resentment that 
demanding can occasion. For example, if an employee demands time off without first making a 
request, a scheduling manager can express resentment with impunity, perhaps by saying, “All 
you had to do was ask!” Or if an employee demands time off on the two days before a major 
deadline in order to binge watch a television series, the scheduling manager can express 
resentment with impunity, perhaps by saying, “It is wrong to leave your colleagues in the lurch 
for frivolous reasons!” Because demanding implies substantive and procedural criticism of 
addressees, a speaker who demands undertakes a risk of resentment for unfairly impugning 
addressees’ conduct—for failing to make good on the claim to be in the right. As a result, 
demanding communicatively creates a context in which, first, addressees can reason that the 
demander would not risk criticism for unfairly impugning their conduct unless she can show she 
occupies the high ground. Significantly, because norms that speakers bring to bear in a situation 
are reciprocal, bringing to bear the norm of right makes might constrains addressees from 
exercising institutional or coercive power, because doing so would put them at risk of criticism 
for using strong-arm tactics or abusing their position of authority and for failing to see the 
rightness of the speaker’s position. Consequently, second, demanding communicatively creates a 
context in which a speaker can reason that addressees will accede to demands in order to avoid 
criticism for remaining conspicuously in the wrong, or at least give the speaker a fair hearing to 
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avoid criticism for not adhering to institutional policies and procedures calling for a fair hearing, 
or for not changing policies and procedures that preclude a fair hearing. Demanding redesigns a 
disagreement space such that arguments may be discussed on their merits. 
Pressure generated just by demanding is not compulsion. Addressees can ignore or 
dismiss demands with impunity if they are manifestly unreasonable—if it is apparent that the 
demander is not substantively in the right. Addressees can also ignore or dismiss demands with 
impunity if they calculate that they will not be held accountable for refusing or failing to see that 
they are in the wrong, or that they can use strong-arm tactics with impunity. Persuasive force is 
grounded in responsibility and accountability, and in some circumstances persons may be held 
accountable for actions only after some time has passed. Addressees may also be able to dismiss 
demands with impunity if the demands are accompanied by coercive tactics—if it appears that 
the demander is not living up to the norm of right makes might. The further demanders step 
outside the bounds of propriety, the more conspicuously the norm of right makes might is 
brought to bear in the situation; but the greater risk of criticism for apparent coercing, 
threatening, impropriety. At the same time, by conspicuously undertaking that risk, demanders 
generate more visibility and therefore accountability for making good on the obligation to show 
the rightness of their demands and the shortcomings of conventional modes of communication 
and the structures in which they occur to produce change.  
In sum, we submit the following model of the normative structure of demanding 
generally. 
1. Demanding makes visible the speaker’s (a) intent and (b) concomitant obligation to 
live up to the norm of right makes might. 
2. The obligation is reciprocal. Both speaker and addressees can hold each other 
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accountable for recognizing and living up to the norm. 
3. As a result, demanding creates two reasons for addressees to accede. 
a. Addressees can reason that the speaker would not risk criticism for acting 
unreasonably, inappropriately, and the like unless she could show that her 
demanding is reasonable, appropriate, and the like—that she is in the right 
substantively and procedurally. 
b. The speaker can reason that addressees will be influenced to accede in order to 
avoid criticism for ignoring manifestly reasonable calls for change, or for 
dismissing or silencing in coercive ways somebody who deserves a fair hearing—
for conspicuously remaining in the wrong. 
The model incorporates Burgess’ (2013, 2015) insights that demanding must be performed 
openly and recognizably, implies a claim to occupy the high ground, communicatively changes 
the context, and entails risks. Further, it hinges on Wanzer-Serrano’s (2015) insight that 
strategies change a scene in a way that generates accountability and therefore persuasive force. 
Our analysis of the normative structure of demanding is based on the most basic 
utterance: “I demand you to x.” Typically just that utterance does not make presumptions 
sufficiently conspicuous to pressure addressees to accede. How can ordinary social actors design 
demands that generate persuasive force? Wanzer-Serrano (2015) has shown how members of the 
Young Lords Organization and the people of El Barrio did just that by acting in accord with the 
organization’s own democratic procedures and by conspicuously displaying (by setting fire to 
piles of uncollected garbage in intersections) that they were substantively and procedurally in the 
right in demanding the sanitation department to collect garbage in El Barrio. In what follows we 
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show how another group of marginalized people designed demands that pressured establishment 
members to accede. 
 
Designing demanding 
Shortly after 5:00 p.m. on Friday, February 4, 1972, C.J. Brune, a senior at the University 
of Kansas, received an excited phone call. On the other end of the line, Mary Coral, the wife of a 
KU faculty member, declared, “It’s on. Come to the head of the alley. Bring enough clothes for a 
week and lots of food” (Brune 2012). Brune, Coral and almost twenty other women who called 
themselves the February Sisters, entered the East Asian Studies building and barricaded the 
doors. Simultaneously, leaflets notifying the campus community that “Women and Children Are 
Now Occupying a Building on Campus” hit the streets, and a “Statement of Action” was sent to 
Chancellor E. L. Chalmers. The statement listed six “non-negotiable demands” including a 
campus daycare center, the development of a women’s studies program, and women’s health 
services. By 10:00 p.m. the Senate Executive Committee was convened and several February 
Sisters representatives left the occupied building to attend a negotiation session. While the first 
session was fruitless, a second session ended with SenEx acceding to two demands: the 
university expressed in writing support for daycare and a health care program (“History” 1972). 
Satisfied with these results, the February Sisters left the building. 
An historian recounts, “After that action, and a few news conferences over the next 
several weeks, they [the February Sisters] never met again as a group, although many of the 
participants remained active in other feminist organizations” (Monhollon 2002, 202). The 
February Sisters are local heroes; their actions are memorialized by a plaque at the site of the 
building they occupied, and the anniversary of their actions continues to be remembered in the 
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local newspaper and on the university campus. Their actions are a well-circumscribed case of 
serious demanding, so well-suited to illustrating how social actors can design demands that 
generate persuasive force. How did the February Sisters design demands, and why could they 
reasonably expect them to pressure administrators to accede?  
To answer that question, we analyze both the February Sisters’ rhetoric and 
administrators’ responses. The February Sisters’ rhetoric comprised a leaflet distributed during 
the occupation of the campus building to students going to Friday films, a “Statement of Action,” 
a “Position Paper,” a “History of the Seizure,” a press release, an editorial in the university 
student newspaper, and their occupation of a campus building. The university’s response 
comprised the minutes of meetings between the university Senate Executive Committee and 
representatives of the February Sisters, an official university response, and other press coverage 
quoting administrators. In what follows we show how the February Sisters did more than say, 
“We demand changes” to attempt to influence administrators to accede. As we have shown, just 
uttering “We demand changes” implies criticism of addressees’ moral compass, implies that the 
speaker can show that she occupies the moral high ground, and implies that the speaker is 
counting on her occupation of the high ground to influence addressees rather than coercion, 
threats, and the like. In what follows we show how the February Sisters designed demands to 
make conspicuously visible that they were undertaking and discharging an obligation to live up 
to the norm of “right makes might,” so redesigning the context to pressure university 
administrators to live up to it as well—to accede to demands or at least giving them a fair 
hearing. 
First, the February Sisters openly made demands. In the leaflet distributed during the 
occupation of the campus building, they wrote, “We are demanding a daycare center for women 
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on campus” and “a complete list of demands” is available at the Student Activities Center 
(“Women and Children” 1972). In the mimeographed “Statement of Action” distributed during 
the occupation, they listed six “non-negotiable demands” and began each with “We demand” 
(1972, 1). In the “Position Paper” released the night of the occupation they wrote, “We demand 
control of our own program. We demand that Chalmers not speak on the topic of achieving 
equity for women” (1972, 2). 
By openly demanding, the February Sisters repeatedly made visible their intent to 
influence administrators to accede. Because openly demanding constrained their ability to 
disclaim the intent to influence by demanding, they communicatively created a context in which 
they could be held accountable for meeting obligations incurred just by demanding. By 
demanding the February Sisters took a step outside the bounds of propriety. In fact, the recorder 
of the minutes of the Senate Executive Committee meeting with representatives of the February 
Sisters used scare quotes to mark the February Sisters’ use of the word “demand”: “Chancellor 
Chalmers cited positive but unpublished progress on several of the ‘demands,’” and another 
university administrator “outlined in detail the University position on the six published 
‘demands’” (“Minutes” 1972, 4). Likewise, a student critical of the February Sisters who 
annotated a copy of the February Sisters’ position paper underlined the word “demands” and 
wrote, “Note: demands—not requests” (“Phillip W. Garrett” 1972, 2). Just by demanding the 
February Sisters incurred an obligation to show that they had good reasons for stepping out of 
bounds—that they were right to do so and not unfairly impugning administrators’ conduct. In 
other words, they incurred an obligation to live up to the norm that right makes might. 
Because undertaking and discharging obligations is the source of persuasive force, 
ordinarily social actors make special efforts to show they are living up to obligations incurred in 
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the performance of a basic illocutionary act such as demanding. How did the February Sisters not 
just imply but explicitly show that they were procedurally and substantively in the right? First, 
they displayed grounds that they were procedurally in the right in the “Position Paper” by 
writing, “The Chancellor has overtly ignored legitimate demands of women at KU for three 
years” and “Program after program has been met with administrators [sic] ennui if not outright 
hostility” (1972, 1). Likewise, the February Sisters distributed at a table in the Kansas Union a 
history of their actions that began, “Women have been working for three years through 
legitimate channels on a number of issues” (“History” 1972, 1). Second, they displayed grounds 
that they were substantively in the right. In a press statement released to the university 
information center, the February Sisters referred to “accompanying leaflets” for “reasons for this 
action” (“Press release” 1972). For example, the “Position Paper” displayed grounds for their 
demand for on-campus daycare, including the amount and kind of work that women performed 
at the university, and the “institutionalized discouragement of all women to use their talents and 
skills in areas outside of domestic duties” (“Position” 1972, 2). Similarly, the February Sisters 
described the handling of birth control at the university health care center as haphazard and 
inconsistent: “[d]octors vary according to personal belief, practice, and mood concerning birth 
control” (“Position” 1972, 4). By displaying that they had good reasons for impugning 
administrators’ conduct, the February Sisters made good on a claim to be in the right.  
As they displayed grounds for impugning administrators’ conduct, so they displayed that 
they were counting on conspicuously occupying the high ground to be the source of their power 
rather than coercion by occupying a campus building. In “A Statement of Action” they wrote that 
they “feel it [the occupation] is a means of obtaining resources to meet the pressing needs of 
women” and they do not intend to “damage property or violate laws other than those few central 
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to our act. We do not intend to ‘substantially obstruct the operation of the University’ in any 
way” (1972, 1). Likewise, in a press release they wrote, “Our actions are non-violent, non-
destructive, and carried out with the specific intention of showing our strength and solidarity, and 
of drawing public attention to our pressing needs” (“Press release” 1972; see also “History” 
1972, 6, 7; Scott, Pryce, and Franke 1972). In press coverage a sympathetic administrator noted 
the February Sisters were aware that they risked arrest, expulsion, and loss of parental support: 
“They didn’t want to damage anything and they were careful not to” (Henry 1972). Damaging 
property would have made them vulnerable to a charge of threat or coercion—of failing to live 
up to the norm of right makes might. 
So far we have shown that the February Sisters (1) openly demanded so visibly (a) 
displayed their intent to influence administrators to accede and (b) incurred an obligation to live 
up to the norm of right makes might. They displayed that they were in the right by explicitly 
stating grounds for substantive and procedural criticisms of administrators. Likewise, they 
displayed that being in the right was the source of might by toeing a line of propriety as they 
occupied a campus building and explicitly disclaimed violent tactics. But why could they 
reasonably expect just those strategies to influence administrators to accede? 
The visibility of the obligation created a context in which both the February Sisters and 
administrators could be held accountable for living up to it; the obligation to live up to the norm 
of right makes might was reciprocal. The reciprocal nature of the obligation is indicated by 
administrators bringing it to bear in the situation as well. In the official university position 
statement they wrote, “To achieve legitimate goals by means which can assure their attainment 
and acceptance, free discussion, recognition of the rights and responsibilities of all parties 
involved, and persuasion rather than coercion must be employed” (“Minutes” 1972, 11); and “To 
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accede to the demands made on this basis [occupation of the campus building] would be to 
violate the rights of all other members of the University community and attack the fundamental 
liberties of free discussion, careful consideration of alternative courses of action in arriving at 
decisions, and the rule of reason for which the University stands” (“Minutes” 1972, 11). The 
press directly quoted the university position (e.g., “Women’s Lib” 1972; “Sisters Call Off” 1972; 
“KU Women’s Lib” 1972) so both administrators and the February Sisters could be held 
accountable for acting in accord with the norm. 
By visibly, dramatically undertaking and discharging an obligation, incurred just by 
demanding, to live up to the norm of right makes might, the February Sisters changed the context 
to create two reasons for administrators to accede. First, administrators could presume the 
February Sisters would not risk arrest, expulsion, and so on unless they could display that their 
demands had merit—that they could show that administrators were ignoring oppressive 
conditions and failing to live up to procedural norms such as “free discussion, recognition of the 
rights and responsibilities of all parties involved, and persuasion.” This reason created just by 
demanding is an essential part of the normative structure of demanding, without which its 
persuasive force diminishes or collapses. If speakers can talk with no risk—no responsibility or 
accountability—then the talk is cheap and can be ignored with impunity. 
Certainly administrators recognized that the February Sisters’ talk would not appear to be 
cheap, and in fact tried to undermine its persuasive force—to deny the efficacy of the February 
Sisters’ demanding—by trying to show that they had beat the February Sisters to the substantive 
and procedural high ground. First, they reported that unpublished progress on some demands was 
already occurring. In newspaper coverage of the event, the director of university relations and 
development “said KU may have been at fault for not publicizing its efforts more, as the women 
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were unaware of many steps the University had taken and was contemplating” (“‘Sisters’ End” 
1972). Likewise, the “University Position” included statements that “The Senate Executive 
Committee has been deeply concerned about equal opportunity for women and has been 
involved in discussions with the Chancellor and other members of the administration and the 
staff for some months,” and “Chancellor Chalmers pointed out that significant action already had 
been taken on many of the women’s demands” and listed them (“Minutes” 1972, 4). Second, 
administrators explicitly brought to bear the norm of right makes might as they called for “free 
discussion” of the issues. In short, the value of the February Sisters’ talk is indicated by 
administrators trying to take their positions for themselves. 
A second reason for influence created just by demanding is that to avoid criticism for 
failing to live up to the norm of right makes might, administrators will accede. This part of the 
normative structure is apparent from the February Sisters’ metadiscourse about their demand 
strategy: “unless Senex gave written commitment to the establishment of a day-care center and 
the implementation of a health care program for women, [. . .] we would remain in the building 
until we were removed by force” (“History” 1972, 7). To avoid the “bad publicity” (Lawhorn 
2013; Rombeck 2002) of a charge of coercion—of failing to live up to the norm of right makes 
might—administrators took the demands seriously. Administrators could have called in law 
enforcement authorities, but then they would have been vulnerable to a charge of coercion. Thus 
the February Sisters’ extraordinary action and risk of criticism on procedural grounds pressured 
administrators to publicly take responsibility for their actions and engage in more apparently 
democratic procedures to address their substantive criticisms. 
In sum, the February Sisters designed demands using strategies that constrained 
administrators from ignoring or perfunctorily dismissing them. Just by uttering demands they 
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implied that administrators were procedurally and substantively in the wrong, and incurred an 
obligation to live up to the norm of right makes might. But they did more, as demanders typically 
need to do in order for demands to generate persuasive force. They displayed grounds for 
demanding at all and, by occupying a campus building and disclaiming violence, displayed that 
they were counting on the rightness of their position rather than coercion to influence 
administrators to accede. They communicatively designed a “normative terrain” (Goodwin 2011, 
291) such that administrators could be held accountable for living up to the norm so created a 




In short, by (1) openly demanding, the February Sisters made visible their (a) intent and 
(b) concomitant obligation to live up to the norm of right makes might. Because (2) the 
obligation was reciprocal, the strategy communicatively changed the scene (3) to create two 
reasons for administrators to accede. First, (a) administrators could reason that the February 
Sisters would not risk resentment unless they could show good reasons for staking a claim to the 
substantive and procedural high ground. Second, (b) the February Sisters could reason that 
administrators, rather than risk criticism for failing to live up to the norm of right makes might, 
would accede. The February Sisters’ rhetoric was designed to display grounds for presumptions 
generated just by uttering demands—to show they were in the right procedurally and 
substantively. Likewise, occupying the campus building and disclaiming violence were designed 
to display that they were counting on their being in the right—not coercion—to influence 
administrators to live up to that same norm and accede, or at least engage in “free discussion.” 
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Our analysis shows why demanding is a fundamental strategy for resisting oppression. 
Persuasive effects may not be immediate; social actors may need to demand and engage in other 
rhetorical activities for days or decades to create conditions in which it becomes increasingly 
difficult to make sexist, racist, homophobic, and the like remarks, and to turn a blind eye to 
systemic sexism, racism, homophobia, and the like with impunity. Failed demands may not only 
serve identitarian desiderata of a more just political culture but also, by bringing to bear the norm 
of right makes might, reaffirm a fundamental norm of political interaction. 
                                                        
1 We use “paradigm case” in the sense used by O’Keefe (1982): a case that would elicit 
widespread agreement that it is an example of some concept, in contrast to a borderline case or 
an empirically common case. 
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